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Some facts about poverty 
Consider these facts: by the most cautious estimates, 400 
million people lack the calories, protein, vitamins and 
minerals needed to sustain their bodies and minds in a 
healthy state. Millions are constantly hungry; others suffer 
from deficiency diseases and from infections they would be 
able to resist on a better diet. Children are the worst affected. 
According to one study, 14 million children under five die 
every year from the combined effects of malnutrition and 
infection. In some districts half the children born can be 
expected to die before their fifth birthday. 
But lack of food is not the only hardship of the poor. To 
give a broader picture, Robert McNamara, when president 
of the World Bank, suggested the term 'absolute poverty'. 
McNamara has summed up absolute poverty as 'a condition 
of life so characterised by malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, 
squalid surroundings, high infant mortality and low life 
expectancy as to be beneath any reasonable definition of 
human decency'. Absolute poverty is, as McNamara has 
said, responsible for the loss of countless lives, especially 
among infants and young children. When absolute poverty 
does not cause death, it still causes misery of a kind not 
often seen in the affluent nations. 
Death and disease apart, absolute poverty remains a 
miserable condition of life, with inadequate food, shelter, 
clothing, sanitation, health services and education. The 
Worldwatch Institute estimates that as many as 1.2 billion 
people - or 23 per cent of the world's population - live in 
absolute poverty. For the purposes of this estimate, absolute 
poverty is defined as 'the lack of sufficient income in cash 
or kind to meet the most basic biological needs for food, 
clothing, and shelter'. Absolute poverty is probably the 
principal cause of human misery today. 
Some facts about wealth 
This is the background situation, the situation that prevails 
on our planet all the time. It does not make headlines. 
People died from malnutrition and related diseases yesterday, 
and more will die tomorrow. The occasional droughts, 
cyclones, earthquakes and floods that take the lives of tens 
of thousands in one place and at one time are more 
newsworthy. They add greatly to the total amount of human 
suffering; but it is wrong to assume that when there are no 
major calamities reported, all is well. 
Yet it is clear that this wealth exists. Against the picture of 
absolute poverty that McNamara has painted, one might 
pose a picture of 'absolute affluence'. Those who are 
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absolutely affluent are not necessarily affluent by comparison 
with their neighbours, but they are affluent by any reasonable 
definition of human needs. This means that they have more 
income than they need to provide themselves adequately 
with all the basic necessities of life. After buying, either 
directly or through their taxes, food, shelter, clothing, basic 
health services, and education, the absolutely affluent are 
still able to spend money on luxuries. The absolutely affluent 
choose their food for the pleasures of the palate, not to stop 
hunger; they buy new clothes to look good, not to keep 
warm; they move house to be in a better neighbourhood or 
have a playroom for the children, not to keep out the rain; 
and after all this there is still money to spend on stereo 
systems, video cameras and overseas holidays. 
At this stage I am making no ethical judgements about 
absolute affluence, merely pointing out that it exists. Its 
defining characteristic is a significant amount of income 
above the level necessary to provide for the basic human 
needs of oneself and one's dependents. By this standard, 
the majority of citizens of Western Europe, North America, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the oil rich Middle 
Eastern states are all absolutely affluent. Only by 
transferring some of the wealth of the rich nations to the 
poor can the situation be changed. 
At present however, very little is being transferred. Only 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, and some of the oil 
exporting Arab states have reached the modest target, set 
by the United Nations, of 0.7 per cent of gross national 
product (GNP). Britain gives 0.31 per cent of its GNP in 
official development assistance and a small additional 
amount in unofficial aid from voluntary organisations. The 
total comes to about two pounds (Sterling) per month per 
person and compares with 5.5 per cent of GNP spent on 
alcohol and 3 per cent on tobacco. Other, even wealthier 
nations, give little more: Germany gives 0.41 per cent and 
Japan 0.32 per cent. The United States gives a mere 0.15 
per cent of its GNP. 
The moral equivalent of murder? 
If these are the facts, we cannot avoid concluding that by 
not giving more than we do, people in rich countries are 
allowing those in poor countries to suffer from absolute 
poverty, with consequent malnutrition, ill health and death. 
This is not a conclusion that applies only to governments. 
It applies to each absolutely affluent individual, for each of 
us has the opportunity to do something about the situation; 
for instance, to give our time or money to voluntary 
organisations. If, then, allowing someone to die is not 
intrinsically different from killing someone, it would seem 
that we are all murderers. 
Is this verdict too harsh? Many will reject it as self-evidently 
absurd. They would sooner take it as showing that allowing 
to die cannot be equivalent to killing than as showing that 
living in an affluent style without contributing to an overseas 
aid agency is ethically equivalent to going over to Ethiopia 
and shooting a few peasants. And no doubt, put as bluntly 
as that, the verdict is too harsh. There are several significant 
differences between spending money on luxuries instead of 
using it to save lives and deliberately shooting people. 
First, the motivation will normally be different. Those who 
deliberately shoot others go out of their way to kill; they 
presumably want their victims dead, from malice, sadism, 
or some equally unpleasant motive. At worst, spending 
money on luxuries instead of giving it away indicates 
selfishness and indifference to the sufferings of others, 
characteristics that may be undesirable but are not 
comparable with actual malice or similar motives. 
Second, it is not difficult for most of us to act in accordance 
with a rule against killing people: it is, on the other hand, 
very difficult to obey a rule that commands us to save all 
the lives we can. To live in a comfortable, or even luxurious 
life it is not necessary to kill anyone; but it is necessary to 
allow some to die whom we might have saved, for the money 
that we need to live comfortably could have been given away. 
A third difference is the greater certainty of the outcome of 
shooting when compared with not giving aid. If I point a 
loaded gun at someone at close range and pull the trigger, 
it is virtually certain that the person will be killed; whereas 
the money that I could give might be spent on a project that 
turns out to be unsuccessful and helps no one. 
Fourth, when people are shot there are identifiable 
individuals who have been harmed. We can point to them 
and to their grieving families. In a time of famine I may 
see dead bodies and grieving families on television reports, 
and I might not doubt that my money would have saved 
some of them; even then it is impossible to point to a body 
and say that had I not bought my stereo, that person would 
have survived. 
Fifth, it might be said that the plight of the hungry is not 
my doing and so I cannot be held responsible for it. The 
starving would have been starving if I had never existed. If 
I kill, however, I am responsible for my victim's deaths, for 
those people would not have died if I had not killed them. 
These differences need not shake our previous conclusion 
that there is no intrinsic difference between killing and 
allowing to die. They are extrinsic differences, that is, 
differences normally but not necessarily associated with the 
distinction between killing and allowing to die. 
To explain our conventional ethical attitudes is not to justify 
them. Here is a summary of the five differences that 
normally exist between killing and allowing to die, in the 
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context of absolute poverty and overseas aid. The lack of 
an identifiable victim is of no moral significance, though it 
may play an important role in explaining our attitudes. The 
idea that we are directly responsible for those we kill, but 
not for those we do not help, depends on a questionable 
notion of responsibility and may need to be based on a 
controversial theory of rights. Differences in certainty and 
motivation are ethically significant, and show that not aiding 
the poor is not to be condemned as murdering them; it 
could, however, be on a par with killing someone as a result 
of reckless driving, which is serious enough. Finally, the 
difficulty of completely discharging the duty of saving all 
one possibly can makes it inappropriate to blame those who 
fall short of this target as we blame those who kill; but this 
does not show that the act itself is less serious. Nor does it 
indicate anything about those who, far from saving all they 
possibly can, make no effort to save anyone. 
These conclusions suggest a new approach. Instead of 
attempting to deal with the contrast between affluence and 
poverty by comparing not saving with deliberate killing, 
let us consider afresh whether we have an obligation to assist 
those whose lives are in danger and, if so, how this obligation 
applies to the present world situation. 
The argument for an obligation to assist 
The path from the library at my university to the humanities 
lecture theatre passes a shallow ornamental pond. Suppose 
that on my way to give a lecture I notice that a small child 
has fallen in and is in danger of drowning. Would anyone 
deny that I ought to wade in and pull the child out? This 
will mean getting my clothes muddy and either cancelling 
my lecture or delaying it until I can find something dry to 
change into; but compared with the avoidable death of a 
child this is insignificant. 
A plausible principle that would support the judgment that 
I ought to pull the child out is this: if it is in our power to 
prevent something very bad from happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
significance, we ought to do it. This principle seems 
uncontroversial. It will obviously win the assent of 
consequentialists; but non consequentialists should accept 
it too because the injunction to prevent what is bad applies 
only when nothing comparably significant is at stake. Thus 
the principle cannot lead to the kinds of actions of which 
non consequentialists strongly disapprove - serious 
violations of individual rights, injustice, broken promises, 
and so on. If non consequentialists regard any of these as 
comparable in moral significance to the bad thing that is to 
be prevented, they will automatically regard the principle 
as not applying in those cases in which the bad thing can 
only be prevented by violating rights, doing injustice, 
breaking promises, or whatever else is at stake. Most non 
consequentialists hold that we ought to prevent what is bad 
and promote what is good. Their dispute with 
consequentialists lies in their insistence that this is not the 
sole ultimate ethical principle: that it is an ethical principle 
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is not denied by any plausible ethical theory. 
Nevertheless the uncontroversial appearance of the principle 
that we ought to prevent what is bad when we can do so 
without sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
significance is deceptive. If it were taken seriously and 
acted upon, our lives and our world would be fundamentally 
changed. For the principle applies, not just to rate situations 
in which one can save a child from a pond, but to the 
everyday situation in which we can assist those living in 
absolute poverty. In saying this I assume that absolute 
poverty, with its hunger and malnutrition, lack of shelter, 
illiteracy, disease, high infant mortality, and low life 
expectancy, is a bad thing. And I assume that it is within 
the power of the affluent to reduce absolute poverty, without 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance. If 
these two assumptions and the principle we have been 
discussing are correct, we have an obligation to help those 
in absolute poverty that is no less strong than our obligation 
to rescue a drowning child from a pond. Not to help would 
be wrong, whether or not it is intrinsically equivalent to 
killing. Helping is not, as conventionally thought, a 
charitable act that it is praiseworthy to do, but not wrong to 
omit; it is something that everyone ought to do. 
Objections to the argument 
Taking care of our own. Anyone who has worked to increase 
overseas aid will have come across the argument that we 
should look after those near us, our families, and then the 
poor in our own country, before we think about poverty in 
distant places. 
The element of truth in the view that we should first take 
care of our own, lies in the advantage of a recognised system 
of responsibilities. When families and local communities 
look after their own poorer members, ties of affection and 
personal relationships achieve ends that would otherwise 
require a large, impersonal bureaucracy. Hence it would be 
absurd to propose that from now on we all regard ourselves 
as equally responsible for the welfare of everyone in the 
world; but the argument for an obligation to assist does not 
propose that. It applies only when some are in absolute 
poverty and others can help without sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral significance. To allow one's own kin to 
sink into absolute poverty would be to sacrifice something 
of comparable significance; and before that point had been 
reached, the breakdown of the system of family and 
community responsibility would be a factor to weigh the 
balance in favour of a small degree of preference for family 
and community. This small degree of preference is, 
however, decisively outweighed by existing discrepancies 
in wealth and property. 
Property rights. Do people have a right to private property, 
a right that contradicts the view that they are under an 
obligation to give some of their wealth away to those in 
absolute poverty? According to some theories of rights, for 
instance Robert Nozick's, provided one has acquired one's 
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property without the use of unjust means like force and fraud, 
one may be entitled to enormous wealth while others starve. 
This individualistic conception of rights is in contrast to 
other views, like the early Christian doctr~ne to be found in 
the works of Thomas Aquinas, which holds that since 
property exists for the satisfaction of human needs, 
'whatever a man has in superabundance is owed, of natural 
right, to the poor for their sustenance'. A socialist would 
also, of course, see wealth as belonging to the community 
rather than the individual, while utilitarians, whether 
socialist or not, would be prepared to override property rights 
to prevent great evils. 
The argument for an obligation to assist can survive, with 
only minor modifications, even if we accept an 
individualistic theory of property rights. In any case, 
however, I do not think we should accept such a theory. It 
leaves too much to chance to be an acceptable ethical view. 
For instance, those whose forefathers happened to inhabit 
some sandy wastes around the Persian Gulf are now 
fabulously wealthy, because oil lay under those sands; while 
those whose forefathers settled on better land south of the 
Sahara live in absolute poverty, because of drought and bad 
harvests. Can this distribution be acceptable from an 
impartial point of view? If we imagine ourselves about to 
begin life as a citizen of either Bahrein or Chad - but we do 
not know which- would we accept the principle that citizens 
of Bahrein are under no obligation to assist people living in 
Chad? 
Population and the ethics of triage. Perhaps the most 
serious objection to the argument that we have an obligation 
to assist is that since the major cause of absolute poverty is 
overpopulation, helping those now in poverty will only 
ensure that yet more people are born to live in poverty in 
the future. 
In its most extreme form, this objection is taken to show 
that we should adopt a policy of 'triage'. It has been 
suggested that we should apply the same policies to 
countries, according to their prospects of becoming self-
sustaining. We would not aid countries that even without 
our help will soon be able to feed their populations. We 
would not aid countries that, even with our help, will not 
be able to limit their population to a level they can feed. 
We would aid those countries where our help might make 
the difference between success and failure in bringing food 
and population into balance. 
Advocates of this theory are understandably reluctant to 
give a complete list of the countries they would place into 
the 'hopeless' category; Bangladesh has been cited as an 
example, and so have some of the countries of the Sahel 
region of Africa. Adopting the policy of triage would, then, 
mean cutting off assistance to these countries and allowing 
famine, disease and natural disasters to reduce the 
population of those countries to the level at which they can 
provide adequately for all. 
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Against this view, some writers have argued that 
overpopulation is a myth. The world produces ample food 
to feed its population and could, according to some 
estimates, feed ten times as many. People are hungry not 
because there are too many but because of inequitable land 
distribution, the manipulation of Third World economies 
by the developed nations, wastage of food in the West and 
so on. 
Those who advocate triage are proposing that we allow the 
population growth of some countries to be checked by a 
rise in death rates - that is, by increased malnutrition and 
related diseases; by widespread famines; by increased infant 
mortality; and by epidemics of infectious diseases. Yet the 
consequences of triage on this scale are so horrible that we 
are inclined to reject it without further argument. How 
could we sit by our television sets, watching millions starve 
while we do nothing? Would not that be the end of all 
notions of human equality and respect for human life? Don't 
people have a right to our assistance, irrespective of the 
consequences? 
We can assist poor countries to raise the living standards of 
the poorest members of their population. We can encourage 
the governments of these countries to enact land reform 
measures, improve education and liberate women from a 
purely child bearing role. We can also help other countries 
to make contraception and sterilisation widely available. 
There is a fair chance that these measures will hasten the 
onset of the demographic transition and bring population 
growth down to a manageable level. Success cannot be 
guaranteed; but the evidence suggests that we can reduce 
population growth by improving economic security and 
education, and making contraceptives more widely 
available. This prospect makes triage ethically 
unacceptable. We cannot allow millions to die from 
starvation and disease when there is a reasonable probability 
that population can be brought under control without such 
horrors. 
Population growth is therefore not a reason against giving 
overseas aid, although it should make us think about the 
kind of aid to give. Instead of food handouts, it may be 
better to give aid that leads to a slowing of population 
growth. This may mean agricultural assistance for the rural 
poor, or assistance with education, or the provision of 
contraceptive services. Whatever kind of aid proves most 
effective in specific circumstances, the obligation to assist 
is not reduced. 
One awkward question remains. What should we do about 
a poor and already overpopulated country that, for religious 
or nationalist reasons, restricts the use of contraceptives 
and refuses to slow its population growth? Should we 
nevertheless offer development assistance? Or should we 
make our offer conditional on effective steps being taken to 
reduce the birth rate? To the latter cpurse, some would 
object that putting conditions on aid is an attempt to impose 
our own ideas on independent sovereign nations. So it is -
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but is this imposition unjustifiable? If the argument for an 
obligation to assist is sound, we have an obligation to reduce 
absolute poverty; but we have no obligation to make 
sacrifices that, to the best of our knowledge, have no prospect 
of reducing poverty in the long run. Hence we have no 
obligation to assist countries whose governments have 
policies that will make our aid ineffective. This could be 
very harsh on poor citizens of these countries - for they 
may have no say in the government's policies- but we will 
help more people in the long run by using our resources 
where they are most effective. The same principles may 
apply, incidentally, to countries that refuse to take other 
steps that could make assistance effective- like refusing to 
reform systems of land holding that impose intolerable 
burdens on poor tenant farmers. 
Leaving it to the government. We often hear that overseas 
aid should be a government responsibility, not left to 
privately run charities. Giving privately, it is said, allows 
the government to escape its responsibilities. 
Since increasing government aid is the surest way of making 
a significant increase to the total amount of aid given, I 
would agree that the governments of affluent nations should 
give much more genuine, no-strings-attached aid than they 
give now. Less than one-sixth of one per cent of GNP is a 
scandalously small amount for a nation as wealthy as the 
United States to give. Even the official UN target of 0. 7 per 
cent seems much less than affluent nations can and should 
give - though it is a target few have reached. But is this a 
reason against each of us giving what we can privately, 
through voluntary agencies? To believe that it is seems to 
assume that the more people there are who give through 
voluntary agencies, the less likely it is that the government 
will do its part. Is this plausible? The opposite view - that 
if no one gives voluntarily the government will assume that 
its citizens are not in favour of overseas aid, and will cut its 
programme accordingly - is more reasonable. In any case, 
unless there is a definite probability that by refusing to give 
we would be helping to bring about an increase in 
government assistance, refusing to give privately is wrong 
for the same reason that triage is wrong: it is a refusal to 
prevent a definite evil for the sake of a very uncertain gain. 
The onus of showing how a refusal to give privately will 
make the government give more is on those who refuse to 
give. 
This is not to say that giving privately is enough. Certainly 
we should campaign for entirely new standards for both 
public and private overseas aid. We should also work for 
fairer trading arrangements between rich and poor countries, 
and less domination of the economies of poor countries by 
multinational corporations more concerned about producing 
profits for shareholders back home than food for the local 
poor. Perhaps it is more important to be politically active 
in the interests of the poor than to give to them oneself- but 
why not do both? Unfortunately, many use the view that 
overseas aid is the government's responsibility as a reason 
against giving, but not as a reason for being politically active. 
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Too high a standard? The final objection to the argument 
for an obligation to assist is that it sets a standard so high 
that none but a saint could attain it. This objection comes 
in at least three versions. The first maintains that, human 
nature being what it is, we cannot achieve so high a standard, 
and since it is absurd to say that we ought to do what we 
cannot do, we must reject the claim that we ought to give so 
much. The second version asserts that even if we could 
achieve so high a standard, to do so would be undesirable. 
The third version of the objection is that to set so high a 
standard is undesirable because it will be perceived as too 
difficult to reach, and will discourage many from even 
attempting to do so. 
Those who put forward the first version of the objection are 
often influenced by the fact that we have evolved from a 
natural process in which those with a high degree of concern 
for their own interests, or the interests of their offspring 
and kin, can be expected to leave more descendants in future 
generations, and eventually to completely replace any who 
are entirely altruistic. I have already noted, in discussing 
the objection that we should first take care of our own, the 
very strong tendency for partiality in human beings. We 
naturally have a stronger desire to further our own interests 
and those of our close kin than we have to further the 
interests of strangers. What this means is that we would be 
foolish to expect widespread conformity to a standard that 
demands impartial concern, and for that reason it would 
scarcely be appropriate or feasible to condemn all those who 
fail to reach such a standard. Yet to act impartially, though 
it might be very difficult, is not impossible. The commonly 
quoted assertion that 'ought' implies 'can' is a reason for 
rejecting such moral judgements as 'You ought to have saved 
all the people from the sinking ship', when in fact if you 
had taken one more person into the lifeboat it would have 
sunk and you would not have saved any. In that situation, 
it is absurd to say that you ought to have done what you 
could not possibly do. When we have money to spend on 
luxuries and others are starving, however, it is clear that 
we can all give much more than we do give, and we can 
therefore all come closer to the impartial standard proposed 
in this paper. Nor is there, as we approach closer to this 
standard, any barrier beyond which we cannot go. For that 
reason there is no basis for saying that the impartial standard 
is mistaken because 'ought' implies 'can' and we cannot 
be impartial. 
The second version of the objection has been put by several 
philosophers during the past decade, among them Susan 
Wolf in a forceful article entitled 'Moral Saints'. Wolf argues 
that if we all took the kind of moral stance defended in this 
chapter we would have to do without a great deal that makes 
life interesting: opera, gourmet cooking, elegant clothes 
and professional sport, for a start. The kind of life we come 
to see as ethically required of us would be a single-minded 
pursuit of the overall good, lacking that broad diversity of 
interests and activities that, on a less demanding view, can 
. be part of our ideal of a good life for a human being. To 
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this, however, one can respond that while the rich and varied 
life that Wolf upholds as an ideal may be the most desirable 
form of life for a human being in a world of plenty, it is 
wrong to assume that it remains a good life in a world in 
which buying luxuries for oneself means accepting the 
continued avoidable suffering of others. 
The third version of the objection asks: might it not be 
counterproductive to demand that people give up so much? 
Might not people say: 'As I can't do what is morally 
required anyway, I won't bother to give at all'. If, however, 
we were to set a more realistic standard, people might make 
a genuine effort to reach it. Thus setting a lower standard 
might actually result in more aid being given. 
It is important to get the status of this third version of the 
objection clear. Its accuracy as a prediction of human 
behaviour is quite compatible with the argument that we 
are obliged to give to the point at which by giving more we 
sacrifice something of comparable moral significance. What 
would follow from the objection is that public advocacy of 
this standard of giving is undesirable. It would mean that 
in order to do the maximum to reduce absolute poverty, we 
should advocate a standard lower than the amount we think 
people really ought to give. Of course we ourselves~ those 
of us who accept the original argument, with its higher 
standard - would know that we ought to do more than we 
publicly propose people ought to do, and we might actually 
give more than we urge others to give. There is no 
inconsistency here, since in both our private and our public 
behaviour we are trying to do what will most reduce absolute 
poverty. 
Is it true that the standard set by our argument is so high as 
to be counterproductive? There is not much evidence to go 
by, but discussions of the argument with students and others 
have led me to think it might be. Yet, the conventionally 
accepted standard - a few coins in a collection tin when one 
is waved under your nose - is obviously far too low. What 
level should we advocate? Any figure will be arbitrary, but 
there may be something to be said for a round percentage 
of one's income like, say, 10 per cent- more than a token 
donation, yet not so high as to be beyond all but saints. 
Some families, of course, will find 10 per cent a considerable 
strain on their finances. Others may be able to give more 
without difficulty. No figure should be advocated as a rigid 
minimum or maximum; but it seems safe to advocate that 
those earning average or above average incomes in affluent 
societies, unless they have an unusually large number of 
dependents or other special needs, ought to give a tenth of 
their income to reducing absolute poverty. By any reasonable 
ethical standards this is the minimum we ought to do, and 
we do wrong if we do less. 
This is an adapted version of a chapter in Peter Singer's 
book entitled Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 
1993 .. 
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